It was an off-hand compliment during a January 2007 dinner meeting between
Abu Dhabi crown prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, plus staff,
and then-U.S. Central Commander boss General John Abizaid. But Al
Nayhan’s jocular praise, as reported in WikiLeaks’ trove of leaked
diplomatic cables, is a rare admission that the United States played a
central role in the disastrous December 2006 Ethiopian invasion of
Somalia, a move that ultimately emboldened the very Islamic extremists
the U.S. and Ethiopia had hoped to squash.
“The Somalia job was fantastic,” Al Nahyan interjected between
discussions of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the prince’s desire to buy Reaper
drones for his air force. At the time of Al Nahyan’s comment, the dust
was just settling from Ethiopia’s Blitzkrieg-style assault toward
Mogadishu. Some 50,000 Ethiopian troops, supported by T-55 tanks, Hind
helicopters and Su-27 jet fighters, had cut a bloody swath through the
lightly-armed forces of the Islamic Courts Union, an alliance of mostly
nationalist Islamic fighters that prior to the invasion had controlled
much of Somalia.
The Somali attack had surprised outside observers. Ethiopia and
Somalia had been rivals a long time, but no one had expected such brutal
fighting, and so suddenly. It was fairly obvious that Ethiopia had
received significant help — even urging — for its invasion. For one,
Ethiopia’s air force did not appear capable of coordinated air strikes
in support of on-the-move ground troops; it seemed likely that the
Su-27s were piloted by Russian or Ukrainian mercenaries — a time-honored
tradition in Africa. What’s more, Ethiopia’s army didn’t possess the
intelligence or logistical skill for long-range operations. Those, not
coincidentally, are particular American strengths.
Washington certainly had a motive to get involved in Somalia. There
was growing concern in the White House and the Pentagon that Somalia’s
Islamists might ally themselves with Al Qaeda and turn to international
terrorism. Already with two escalating wars on its own plate, the U.S.
was in no position to openly lead its own large-scale attack on Somalia.
It’d have been far simpler to simply sponsor somebody else to do the
dirty work. Enter Ethiopia.
In early January following the invasion, USA Today’s Barbara Slavin reported on Washington’s extensive behind-the-scenes support for
Ethiopian troops. “The ties include intelligence sharing, arms aid and
training,” Slavin noted. A couple days later, The Washington Post’s
Pauline Jelinek, citing anonymous sources, described U.S. Special Forces
accompanying Ethiopian troops. CBS news revealed that U.S. Air Force
gunships were active over southern Somalia during the Ethiopian blitz.
Through all the reporting, U.S. officials remained vague or silent on
the subject of Washington’s involvement. All the same, evidence was
mounting that the U.S. had played a leading role in the Ethiopian
invasion. Journalists only strongly suspected it, but Abu Dhabi prince
Al Nayhan apparently knew it for certain, if his praise of “the Somalia
job” was any indication.
Three years later, it’s clear the Ethiopian invasion was a bad idea.
The attack rallied Somalis of all stripes and politics against the
invaders, ultimately boosting support for fringe Islamic groups that now
had a clear enemy in the Ethiopians and their suspected American
puppet-masters. Violence mounted as the Ethiopians settled in for a
bloody, two-year occupation.
When the Ethiopians withdrew in 2009, the Islamists rushed to fill
the vacuum. A year later, the Al Shabab Islamic group, successor to the
Islamic Courts, conducted its first international terror attack. Last
month, a Somali-born American teen plotted to explode a bomb in
Portland. Today, U.S. Special Forces continue to target terrorists in
Somalia. There are arguably more of them than ever, thanks in part to
the botched Ethiopian invasion. “We’ve made a lot of mistakes and
Ethiopia’s entry in 2006 was not a really good idea,” U.S. diplomat
Donald Yamamoto said in March.
